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REFLECTIONS ON THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL 

SEGREGATION IN HOUSING 

ALAN C. WEINSTEIN• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
My reflection on Professor Roberts' Sullivan Lecture poses two 
questions. First, how far have we come as a nation from the hyper­
segregated housing patterns of the 1930s through 1960s that Professor 
Roberts described in her lecture? Regrettably, the answer appears to be not 
far at all. Further, we are today faced with a second form of hyper­
segregation, one based on income rather than race. 1 Second, why have we 
made so little progress to date in addressing housing segregation? The 
simple answer here, of course, is that efforts to address the situation 
Professor Roberts describes have proved inadequate.2 But why? While a 
comprehensive answer to that question is well beyond the scope of this 
writing, the author examines why one of the efforts has proven inadequate: 
the attempts to combat "exclusionary zoning."3 
II. RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION THEN AND Now 
Professor Roberts' article notes that, using one common measure of 
racial segregation, the "isolation index," which measures the extent to 
which blacks live in neighborhoods that are predominantly black, "[t]he 
spatial isolation of African-Americans in Chicago 'increased from only 
Copyright© 2016, Alan C. Weinstein. 
•Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law/Professor of Urban Studies, 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University. 
1 See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon & Kendra Bischoff, Growth in the Residential Segregation 
of Families by Income, 1970-2009, US2010 PROJECT (Nov. 2011), https:// 
s4.ad.brown.edu/Projects/Diversity/Data/Report/reportl 11111.pdf [https://perma.ccff4RG­
XW4F] (concluding that segregation of families by income has grown significantly in the 
last 40 years); Paul A. Jargowsky, The Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, the 
Concentration ofPoverty, and Public Policy, CENTURY FOUND. 1 (Aug. 9, 2015), https://s3­
us-west-2.amazonaws.com/production.tcf.org/app/uploads/2015/08/07182514/Jargowsky _ 
ArchitectureofSegregation-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSX2-V7LG] (finding "a dramatic 
increase in the number of high-poverty neighborhoods" and showing that the "number of 
people living in high-poverty ghettos, barrios, and slums has nearly doubled since 2000, 
rising from 7.2 million to 13.8 million"). 
2 See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 1, at abstract. 

3 See infra Part IV. 
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"'410% in 1900 to 70% thirty years later. The situation Professor Roberts 
describes has changed little over the ensuing decades. Based on data from 
the US2010 Project, the spatial isolation of African-Americans in Chicago 
had increased to 89.9% by 1980.5 While the isolation index for African­
Americans had declined to 79.9% by 2010,6 that figure still represents a 
relative increase in isolation for African-Americans of over 14% when 
compared to the 1930 figure noted by Professor Roberts.7 
Another commonly used measure of segregation in housing is the 
dissimilarity index.8 As explained by the US2010 Project: 
The dissimilarity index measures whether one particular 
group is distributed across census tracts in the 
metropolitan area in the same way as another group. A 
high value indicates that the two groups tend to live in 
different tracts. D[issimilarity] ranges from 0 to 100. A 
value of 60 (or above) is considered very high. It means 
that 60% (or more) of the members of one group would 
need to move to a different tract in order for the two 
groups to be equally distributed. Values of 40 or 50 are 
usually considered a moderate level of segregation, and 
values of 30 or below are considered to be fairly low.9 
4 Dorothy E. Roberts, Crossing Two Color Lines: Interracial Marriage and Residential 
Segregation in Chicago, 45 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2017) (citing DOUGLASS. MASSEY & 
NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE 
UNDERCLASS 24 (1993)). The isolation index is the percentage of same-group population in 
the census tract where the average member of a racial/ethnic group lives. DOUGLAS S. 
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF 
THE UNDERCLASS 23 (1993). It has a lower bound of zero (for a very small group that is 
quite dispersed) to 100 (meaning that group members are entirely isolated from other 
groups). See id. Thus, the index measures "the extent to which minority members are 
exposed only to one another ...." Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, The Dimensions 
of Residential Segregation, 67 Soc. FORCES 281, 288 (1988); Margery Austin Turner & 
Judson James, Discrimination as an Object of Measurement, 17 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV. 
& REs. 3, 3 (2015) (describing how discrimination in housing is measured). Note, however, 
that this index is "affected by the size of the group-it is almost inevitably smaller for 
smaller groups, and it is likely to rise over time if the group becomes larger." Residential 
Segregation, DIVERSITY & DISPARITIES, https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/ 
segregation201 O/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/SK8X-D9Q B]. 
5 Chicago City, DIVERSITY & DISPARITIES, https://s4.ad.brown.edu/projects/diversity/ 
segregation201O/city.aspx?cityid=1714000 [https://perma.cc/LK46-3DSR ]. 
6 Jd. 
7 See Roberts, supra note 4, at 10-11. 
8 See Chicago City, supra note 5. 
9 Id. 
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Data from Chicago for the dissimilarity index for African-Americans 
mirrors that for the isolation index; in 1980, the dissimilarity index for 
African-Americans ranged from 90.8% to 88.8%, depending on the racial 
group comparator10 and the index declined to between 83.1% and 80.8% 
by 2010. 11 In comparison, the dissimilarity indices for the non-African­
American racial groups-Asians, Hispanics, and Whites-were 
significantly lower, ranging from a high of 67.3% for Asian-Hispanics in 
1980 to a low of 40.8% for Asian-Whites in 2010.12 
The pattern of racial segregation seen in Chicago is not unique. 13 
When researchers William H. Frey and Dowell Myers examined data from 
the 2000 Census,14 they found that 143 of 318 Metropolitan Areas 
(44.97%) had Black-White dissimilarity indices of at least 60%, meaning 
that they fell into the "very high" category .15 Further, only 80 of the 318 
(25.16%) had Black-White dissimilarity indices of 50% or below, meaning 
that they had low to moderate dissimilarity.16 Perhaps most notably, none 
of the 318 had a dissimilarity index in the "fairly low" category of 30% or 
below.17 
10 The 1980 dissimilarity index was 90.8% between African-Americans and Asians, 
90.6% between African-Americans and Whites, and 88.8% between African-Americans and 
Hispanics. Id. 
11 The 2010 dissimilarity index was 83.1% between African-Americans and Asians, 
82.5% between African-Americans and Whites, and 80.8% between African-Americans and 
Hispanics. Id. 
12 The only dissimilarity index that showed significant improvement between 1980 and 
2010 was White-Asian, declining from 51.4% to 40.8%, a relative decline ofjust over 20%. 
Id. The other indices barely changed during the same period: White-Hispanic went from 
61.4% to 60.9% and Asian-Hispanic from 67.3% to 66.6%. Id. 
13 See Camille Zubrinsky 9harles, The Dynamics ofRacial Residential Segregation, 29 
ANN. REv. Soc. 167 (2003), https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/30036965.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DFV-PUL3] (providing a comprehensive review of the dynamics and 
consequences of racial residential segregation). 
14 Frey and Myers issued a report that accompanied the release of detailed racial 
segregation indices for the 318 U.S. metropolitan areas by CensusScope. William H. Frey 
& Dowell Myers, Neighborhood Segregation in Single-Race and Multirace America: A 
Census 2000 Study of Cities and Metropolitan Areas 1 (Fannie Mae Found., Working 
Paper, 2002), http://www.censusscope.org/FreyWPFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6ML­
8PPE]; United States Segregation: Dissimilarity Indices, CENSUSSCOPE (2000) [hereinafter 
CENSUSSCOPE], http://www.censusscope.org/us/print_rank _dissimilarity_ white_ black.html 
[https://perma.cc/86M7-V5BB]. 
15 See CENSUSSCOPE, supra note 14. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. Note, however, that because a number of the smaller metropolitan areas have 
a small African-American population, CensusScope cautions: "When a group's population 
is small, its dissimilarity index may be high even if the group's members are evenly 
(continued) 
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Compounding these long-standing patterns of racial segregation is the 
more recent growth in spatial segregation by income. 18 Sean Reardon and 
Kendra Bischoff report: 
As overall income inequality grew in the last four decades, 
high- and low-income families have become increasingly 
less likely to live near one another. Mixed income 
neighborhoods have grown rarer, while affluent and poor 
neighborhoods have grown much more common. Jn fact, 
the share of the population in large and moderate-sized 
metropolitan areas who live in the poorest and most 
affluent neighborhoods has more than doubled since 1970, 
while the share of families living in middle-income 
neighborhoods dropped from 65 percent to 44 percent. 
The residential isolation of the both poor and affluent 
families has grown over the last four decades, though 
affluent families have been generally more residentially 
isolated than poor families during this period. Income 
segregation among African Americans and Hispanics grew 
more rapidly than among non-Hispanic whites, especially 
since 2000. These trends are consequential because people 
are affected by the character of the local areas in which 
they live. The increasing concentration of income and 
wealth (and therefore of resources such as schools, parks, 
and public services) in a small number of neighborhoods 
results in greater disadvantages for the remaining neighbor 
hoods where low- and middle-income families live. 19 
Their finding that "[i]ncome segregation among African Americans 
and Hispanics grew more rapidly than among non-Hispanic whites, 
especially since 2000,"20 is confirmed by Paul Jargowsky's research 
finding similar pattems.21 
These findings would seem to suggest that were income inequality 
trends to reverse, and thus narrow the gap between White and Black 
distributed throughout the area. Thus, when a group's population is less than 1,000, 
exercise caution in interpreting its dissimilarity indices." Id. 
18 See Reardon & Bischoff, supra note 1, at abstract 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Jargowsky, supra note I, at 1. See also David Albouy & Mike Zabek, Housing 
Inequality 1 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21916, 2016), 
http://davidalbouy.net/housinginequality.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A4Q-KCBD] (finding 
increasing "compression" of housing inequality in recent years). 
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incomes, that associated racial segregation might abate to some degree. 
But a recently published New York Times analysis of 2014 census data 
concludes that even if that were to occur, patterns of racial segregation in 
housing would largely be unaffected.22 The Times reports: 
Affluent black families, freed from the restrictions of low 
income, often end up living in poor and segregated 
commumttes anyway. It is a national phenomenon 
challenging the popular assumption that segregation is 
more about class than about race, that when black families 
earn more money, some ideal of post-racial integration 
will inevitably be reached. In fact, a New York Times 
analysis of 2014 census figures shows that income alone 
cannot explain, nor would it likely end, the segregation 
that has defined American cities and suburbs for 
generations. The choices that black families make today 
are inevitably constrained by a legacy of racism that 
prevented their ancestors from buying quality housing and 
then passing down wealth that might have allowed today's 
generation to move into more stable communities. And 
even when black households try to cross color boundaries, 
they are not always met with open arms: Studies have 
shown that white people prefer to live in communities 
where there are fewer black people, regardless of their 
income. The result: Nationally, black and white families 
of similar incomes still live in separate worlds.23 
This reflection could cite numerous additional sources documenting 
the persistence of racial segregation in housing up to the present.24 Rather 
22 John Eligon & Robert Gebeloff, Affluent and Black, and Still Trapped by 
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/ 
milwaukee-segregation-wealthy-black-fam ilies. html? _r=O [https://perma.cc/7 4NM-WSN 7). 
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., The Future ofFair Housing, NAT'L COMMISSION FAIR HOUSING & EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY I (Dec. 2008), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/fairhousing/ 
future_ of_fair _ housing_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAS8-8JAJ] (noting the Commission's 
hearings "exposed the fact that despite strong legislation, past and ongoing discriminatory 
practices in the nation's housing and lending markets continue to produce [extreme] levels 
of residential segregation that result in significant disparities between minority and non­
minority households ...."). See also Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice 
Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 967, 967 (2012) (arguing there has been a persistent failure to 
deliver real housing choice and opportunity to communities of color in housing markets 
across the United States); Mireya Navarro, Segregation Is an Obstacle to New York's 
Housing Push, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/images/2016/04/15/ 
(continued) 
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than belabor that point, however, this reflection now turns to the next 
question: why have we made so little progress to date in addressing 
housing segregation? 
Ill. WHY HAS SEGREGATION PERSISTED? 
There is little debate on the answer to that question: a combination of 
public and private policies over the decades have perpetuated our racial 
segregation in housing.25 For example, a recent report from the National 
Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity26 concludes: 
The continuing levels of racial and economic segregation 
in America's metropolitan areas result from a long history 
of public and private discriminatory actions. Segregation 
is rooted in historical practices but is maintained and 
sometimes worsened by continued discriminatory 
practices, including: present-day discrimination and 
steering in the private rental, sales, lending, and insurance 
markets; exclusionary zoning, land use, and school 
nytfrontpage/scan.pdf [https://penna.cc/6Q7X-K43D] (describing the persistence of 
residential racial segregation in New York). 
25 See, e.g., FAlR Hous. COMM'N, http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/ 
National%20Commission/National%20Commission%200utline.pdf [https://penna.cc/826X 
-GW44]. 
26 In 2008, the 40th Anniversary of the Fair Housing Act, several civil rights groups 
agreed that the anniversary provided an excellent opportunity for the civil rights community 
to take stock of the status of fair housing in this country and look toward the future of fair 
housing practices. Id. Accordingly, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education 
Fund (LCCREF), Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCRUL) and the 
National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) created a Fair Housing Commission which 
conducted regional hearings across the country to "gather testimony, research, data and 
information on fair housing enforcement and the persistence of residential segregation forty 
years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act." Id. The hearings, chaired by former HUD 
Secretaries Jack Kemp and Henry Cisneros, explored a number of issues: (i) the persistence 
of discrimination and segregation; (ii) the impact of segregation on our communities and on 
education, and the benefit~ of integrated neighborhoods; (iii) federal fair housing 
enforcement mechanisms; (iv) enforcement by state and local governments and in the 
private sector, including individuals and neighborhood organizations and private, non-profit 
fair housing centers; (v) strategies to break down residential segregation and provide 
households isolated in segregated areas the opportunity to find integrative alternatives; and 
(vi) the shortage of affordable housing and strategies to increase the stock of affordable 
housing. Id. Hearings were held in Chicago on July 15; Houston on July 31; Los Angeles 
on September 9; Boston on September 22; and Atlanta on October 17. The Future ofFair 
Housing, NAT'L FAIR HOUSlNG ALLEGlANCE, http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/ 
nationalcommission/tabid/2963/default.aspx [https://penna.cc/3KVY-LFY8]. Ultimately, 
the hearings concluded with the release of a report put out by the sponsoring organizations 
on December 9. Id. 
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policies at the state and local governmental level; 
continuing government policies affecting the location of 
subsidized housing; the limited choices provided to those 
who receive federal housing assistance; income and wealth 
differences; and bank and insurance disinvestment in 
minority neighborhoods.27 
That conclusion is supported by other sources. For example, a recent story 
in the New York Times discussed the findings of a report issued by the 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition,28 which found that race was 
an important factor in deciding whether banks lend for mortgages in 
certain neighborhoods.29 
Specifically, the report indicated that banks made fewer 
loans to middle- and lower-income borrowers in minority 
neighborhoods than to borrowers with similar incomes in 
white neighborhoods .... Last year, the group did a similar 
analysis of lending in Baltimore, concluding that the racial 
27 The Future ofFair Housing, supra note 24. See also Myron Orfield, Land Use and 
Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 877, 877 (2006); Rachel L. Swams, Biased Lending Evolves, and Blacks Face 
Trouble Getting Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
1013 1 /nyregion/hudson-city-bank-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/PSB9-2N 65] (reporting 
that in 2014 Hudson City Savings Bank approved 1,886 mortgages in an area that included 
New Jersey and sections of New York and Connecticut. However, only twenty-five of 
those loans went to black borrowers, resulting in Hudson-while denying wrongdoing­
agreeing to pay nearly $33 million to settle a lawsuit brought by the federal Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau and Department of Justice). 
28 The website for the Coalition describes the organization as: 
The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) was formed 
in 1990 by national, regional, and local organizations to develop and 
harness the collective energies of community reinvestment 
organizations from across the country so as to increase the flow of 
private capital into traditionally underserved communities. NCRC has 
grown to an association of more than 600 community-based 
organizations that promote access to basic banking services, including 
credit and savings, to create and sustain affordable housing, job 
development and vibrant communities for America's working families. 
About Us, NAT'L COMMUNITY REfNVESTMENT COALITION, http://www.ncrc.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/R5KM-3HK2]. 
29 Peter Eavis, Race Strongly Influences Mortgage Lending in St. Louis, Study Finds, 
N.Y. TrMES (July 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07 /19/business/dealbook/race­
strongly-influences-mortgage-lending-in-st-louis-study-finds.html [https://perma.cc/GAX7­
BECV]. 
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composition of an area often drove where banks made 
mortgages.30 
Another example can be seen in the persistence of "racial steering" as a 
significant factor in perpetuating racial segregation in housing.31 The most 
recent national study of housing discrimination by the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development reported very high levels 
of discrimination and steering against Black, Latino, Asian, and Native 
American home seekers based on the experience of paired testers 
(investigators posing as renters or homebuyers) in major metropolitan 
housing markets. 32 In the same vein is a scholarly article reporting on the 
persistence of racial steering by real estate professionals.33 Other scholars 
have examined how government housing polices perpetuate racial 
. 34segregat10n. 
A comprehensive analysis of each of these factors is well beyond the 
scope of this writing. Rather, below this reflection more closely examines 
one of the efforts that has proved inadequate: the various attempts to 
combat exclusionary zoning. 
IV. MIXED RESULTS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 
Scholars and practitioners have long recognized that many newer 
suburbs, particularly those in the highly urbanized Northeast, engage in so­
called "exclusionary zoning" by using their land-use regulations to 
30 Id. 
31 Rachel Blake, Commentary, Illegal Steering in America: Who's at the Wheel?, 16 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 95, 95 (2007) (reporting a 2006 study of 
twelve major metropolitan areas in the United States finding that steering occurred in at 
least 87% of the studied interactions). 
32 Margery Austin Turner et al., Housing Discrimination Against Racial and Ethnic 
Minorities 2012, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URBAN DEV. xi (June 2013), http:// 
www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/pdf/HUD-514_HDS2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/ AF77 
-AZXJ]. 
Although the most blatant forms of housing discrimination (refusing to 
meet with a minority homeseeker or provide information about any 
available units) have declined since the first national .Paired-testing 
study in 1977, the forms of discrimination that persist (providing 
information about fewer units) raise the costs of housing search for 
minorities and restrict their housing options. 
Id. 
33 See generally Blake, supra note 31. 
34 See, e.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, How Government Housing Perpetuates Racial 
Segregation: Lessons from Post-Katrina New Orleans, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 662 
(2011); Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimination 
and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 How. L.J. 913, 913 (2005). 
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frustrate the development of low- and moderate-income housing and 
encourage low-density, high-cost development.35 The most common 
exclusionary zoning practices include: large mm1mum lot size 
requirements;36 restrictions on multi-family housing;37 prohibition of 
manufactured housing and mobile homes; 38 imposition of fees, exactions 
and costly amenities on new developments;39 and limitations on annual 
growth.40 
In the 1970s, affordable housing advocates and developers seeking to 
build such housing began challenging exclusionary zoning practices in the 
courts and, by 1975, their challenges appeared to have met with 
remarkable success.41 In its landmark opinion in Southern Burlington 
County, NAACP v. Township ofMount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that exclusionary zoning violated equal 
protection and substantive due process guarantees in the state constitution, 
and ruled that New Jersey municipalities had to meet their "fair share" o( 
the "regional need" for low- and moderate-income housing.42 That same 
year, the highest courts in two neighboring states, New York43 and 
Pennsylvania,44 also ruled that municipalities had to consider the effect of 
their zoning regulations on regional housing needs. These victories proved 
35 See, e.g., Norman Williams, Jr. & Thomas Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls.' 
The Case ofNorth-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475, 475 (1971); Richard F. 
Babcock & Fred P. Bosselman, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND 
HOUSING IN THE 1970s 1-3 (1973). 
36 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing 
Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 309 (2002). 
37 See, e.g., Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 10 (2001 ). 
38 See Schuck, supra note 36, at 309. 
39 See Span, supra note 37, at 10. 
40 See, e.g., JOHN M. DEGROVE, THE NEW FRONTIER FOR LAND POLICY: PLANNING AND 
GROWTH MANAGEMENT IN THE STATES 1 (1992). But see Note, State-Sponsored Growth 
Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (1995) 
(arguing that state growth management programs can be used to combat local exclusionary 
zoning). 
41 See James C. Quinn, Challenging Exclusionary Zoning: Contrasting Recent Federal 
and State Court Approaches, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 147, 148-49 (1975). 
42 336 A.2d 713, 734 (N.J. 1975). 
43 Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 341 N.E.2d 236, 241-43 (N.Y. 1975). In 
Berenson, the N.Y. Court of Appeals announced a two-part test for municipal zoning 
ordinances challenged as being exclusionary. Id. at 241-42. The ordinance should: (1) 
provide for a "balanced [and] cohesive community" and (2) take into consideration 
regional, as well as local, housing needs. Id. But the court qualified the latter requirement 
by holding that a municipality need not meet a "fair share" standard unless the regional 
need for low and moderate-income housing is not being met elsewhere. Id. at 242-43. 
44 Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, lnc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975). 
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fleeting, however, as subsequent court decisions in all three states soon 
limited the impact of the "regional fair share" need requirement.45 
While neither the New York nor the Pennsylvania courts after 1975 
have imposed an effective "fair share" housing obligation on local 
governments, the situation is different in New Jersey.46 There, by 1983, it 
had become clear that the exclusion of developed and rural areas from the 
requirement that they meet a "fair share" obligation,47 combined with the 
"numberless" approach to "fair share" issues authorized by the Supreme 
Court's 1977 Oakwood at Madison ruling,48 made Mount Laurel I a paper 
45 See New Jersey: Oakwood at Madison Inc., v. Twp. of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 
1200 (N .J. 1977) (holding that trial courts were not required to calculate "the precise fair 
share of the lower income housing needs of a specifically demarcated region."); Fobe 
Assocs. v. Mayor and Council of Demarest, 379 A.2d 31, 34 (N.J. 1977) and Pascack Ass'n 
Ltd. v. Mayor and Council of Wash. Twp., 379 A.2d 6, 13 (N.J. 1977) (each holding that 
"fair share" requirements need not be applied to "developed" municipalities); Glenview 
Dev. Co. v. Franklin Twp., 397 A.2d 384, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (declining to 
apply "fair share" requirements to rural areas not undergoing development). New York: 
Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Inc. Viii. of Upper Brookville, 414 N.E.2d 680, 683-84 (N.Y. 
I 980) (upholding a five-acre minimum lot requirement, ruling that the Berenson 
requirements were not violated unless there was proof of an exclusionary purpose or the 
ordinance ignored regional housing needs and had an exclusionary effect); Suffolk Hous. 
Servs. v. Town of Brookhaven, 51 I N.E.2d 67, 67-70 (N.Y. 1987) (rejecting a claim that 
zoning restrictions and allegedly cumbersome procedures had prevented development of 
low-income housing in a suburban Long Island town. The ruling held that the plaintiffs had 
not stated a cause of action, in part, because they had not presented the town with a request 
to develop a particular parcel for low-income housing); Suffolk Interreligious Coal. on 
Hous. v. Town of Brookhaven, 575 N.Y.S.2d 548, 549-50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) 
(declining to review a decision rejecting the claims of a group challenging the Brookhaven 
ordinance who met the "particular parcel" requirement referred to in Suffolk Hous. Servs. ); 
Asian Ams. for Equal. v. Koch, 527 N.E.2d 265, 273 (N.Y. 1988) (rejecting an 
exclusionary zoning challenge to the density bonus provisions in New York City's 
Chinatown Special District zoning regulations based on claim that the bonus, while 
intended to promote lower-income housing, was being used for much more expensive 
developments); see generally John R. Nolon, A Comparative Analysis of New Jersey's 
Mount Laurel Cases with the Berenson Cases in New York, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3 
(1986). Pennsylvania: Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Twp., 382 A.2d 
105, 109-10 (Pa. 1977) (reducing "fair share" concept to a non-binding "general precept"); 
BAC, Inc. v. Millcreek Twp., 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993) (holding that only restrictions 
on types of housing, not classes of people, were unlawful); Katrin C. Rowan, Comment, 
Anti-Exclusionary Zoning in Pennsylvania: A Weapon for Developers, a Loss for Low­
Income Pennsylvanians, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2007). See generally Clayton H. 
Collins, Comment, Affordable Housing Options Under Pennsylvania's Three Legislative 
Regimes, 28 J.L. & COM. 247 (2010). 
46 See No Ion, supra note 45, at 3-7. 
47 See Fobe, 379 A.2d at 34; Pascack, 379 A.2d at 13; Glenview, 397 A.2d at 391. 
48 Oakwood, 371 A.2d at 1200, 1216--23. 
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tiger.49 In an effort to revitalize its Mount Laurel "doctrine," the New 
Jersey Supreme Court consolidated an appeal from Mount Laurel 
Township with five other "fair share" cases and issued a mammoth opinion 
that revolutionized land-use regulation in New Jersey .so 
Mount Laurel II specified an array of substantive and procedural 
policies to ensure that its mandate for the creation of low and moderate­
income housing would be fulfilled.s 1 Most critically, the court imposed the 
requirement that a "fair share" burden be calculated for all communities 
designated as "growth areas" in a 1980 state development plan, ruled that 
three judges-each responsible for a different part of the state-be 
appointed to hear and expedite all Mount Laurel "fair share" litigation, and 
empowered these judges to authorize a "builder's remedy" to allow for the 
construction of low-income housing in communities that fail to meet their 
"fair share" obligation.s2 Mount Laurel II also challenged the New Jersey, 
legislature to address the "fair share" issue. s3 In 1985, the legislatur~ 
responded, enacting a Fair Housing Acts4 that replaced court supervision of 
municipal "fair share" obligations with an administrative agency, the 
Council on Affordable Housing. ss The Act provided that a municipality 
49 See, e.g., Henry L. Kent-Smith, Note, The Council on Affordable Housing and the 
Mount Laurel Doctrine: Will the Council Succeed?, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 933 (1987) 
(arguing that Mount Laurel I failed to produce low cost housing); Paula A. Franzese, Mount 
Laurel Ill: The New Jersey Supreme Court's Judicious Retreat, 18 SETON HALL L. REv. 30, 
32 (1988) (arguing that little had changed in the eight years between Mount Laurel I and 
Mount Laurel 11); Alan Mallach, From Mount Laurel to Molehill: Blueprint for Delay, 15 
N.J. REP., Oct. 1985, at 21 (noting that eight years after Mount Laurel I no affordable 
housing had yet been built in Mount Laurel Township). 
50 S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel JI), 456 A.2d 
390, 410 (N.J. 1983). 
51 Id. at418-21. 
52 Id. at 420. See also Alan Mallach, The Tortured Reality of Suburban F.xclusion: 
Zoning, Economics and the Future of the Berenson Decision, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 
119 (1986) (noting that over 100 lawsuits were filed by builders against New Jersey 
municipalities between 1983 and 1986). 
53 S. Burlington, 456 A.2d at 417. 
54 New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270-301-329.9 (West 
2008). See also Franzese, supra note 49, at 36--40 (discussing the Act). 
55 The Council on Affordable Housing (COAR) is an agency of the Government of 
New Jersey within the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs that is responsible for 
ensuring that all 566 New Jersey municipalities provided their fair share of low and 
moderate income housing. The COAR is made up of 12 members appointed by the 
Governor of New Jersey and approved by the New Jersey Senate. N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 52:27D-305 (West 2008). COAH defines housing regions, estimated the needs for 
low/moderate income housing, allocates fair share numbers by municipality and reviews 
plans to fulfill these obligations. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-302, -304 (West 2008). See 
(continued) 
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that failed to participate in the Council's administrative process for 
substantive certification of a "fair share" plan would be subject to the full 
range of remedies previously available through Mount Laurel litigation.56 
One year later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld the Act against a 
facial challenge, a decision commonly referred to as Mount Laurel III. 57 
The most controversial section of the Act was its provision for 
"Regional Contribution Agreements" (RCAs) that allowed suburban 
municipalities to compensate urban municipalities which agreed to accept 
up to 50% of the suburb's "fair share" housing obligation.58 The "sending" 
municipality paid a negotiated fee for each unit transferred.59 Critics 
claimed that RCAs violated the integrationist imperative of the Mount 
Laurel decisions by perpetuating a significant degree of racial and 
economic segregation while supporters of the concept argued that it has 
provided a desperately needed infusion of dollars for housing in the state's 
poorest cities, while still advancing integration in the suburbs.60 RCAs 
were later abolished as part of a major legislative revision of the Fair 
Housing Act in 2008.61 
By 2010, COAH's troubles were mounting. ln 2007, the rules it had 
adopted to implement a new methodology for determining municipal fair 
also Alan Mallach, The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Uncertainties ofSocial Policy in a 
Time ofRetrenchment, 63 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 849, 850 (2011) (describing the COAH). 
56 See generally New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:270­
301-329.9 (West 2008). 
57 Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards in the Cty. of Somerset (Mount Laurel III), 510 
A.2d 621, 634 (N.J. 1986). 
58 New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 52:270-312 (West 2008). 
59 For example, Marlboro Township signed an agreement in June 2008 providing that 
the city of Trenton would build or rehabilitate 332 housing units (out of Marlboro's 1,600­
unit obligation), with Marlboro paying $25,000 per unit for a total of $8.3 million, to 
Trenton for taking on the responsibility for these units. Marlboro Will Pay Trenton to Take 
Affordable Housing, GMNEWS ARCHIVE (June 18, 2008), http://wwwl.gmnews.com/ 
. 2008/06/18/marlboro-wil 1-pay-trenton-to-take-affordable-housing/ [https://penna.cc/8D Y9­
EGPM]. 
6° Compare Rachel Fox, The Selling Out of Mount Laurel: Regional Contribution 
Agreements in New Jersey's Fair Housing Act, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 535, 537, 565-72 
(1988) (criticizing RCAs), with Alan Mallach, supra note 55, at 854 (arguing that "from a 
pragmatic standpoint, RCAs provided an important safety valve for suburban 
municipalities, mitigating at least some of their opposition to Mount Laurel, while offering 
a relatively easy way for urban municipalities to obtain funds for politically attractive 
housing activities"). 
61 Act of July 17, 2008, 2008 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 46 (codified as amended at N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 52:270-329.6 (West 2008)). 
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housing obligations62 were overturned in a lawsuit brought by housing 
advocates63 and the COAH's revised rules were again invalidated in 
2010.64 In January 2011, the New Jersey legislature passed legislation that 
would have abolished COAR, which Governor Chris Christie conditionally 
vetoed due to his disagreement with the fair housing obligations the 
legislation would have imposed on municipalities. 65 Rather than amend 
the legislation to satisfy Governor Christie's objections, the chief sponsor, 
Senator Raymond Lesniak, withdrew the bill on February 7, 2011, and the 
legislature took no further action.66 Governor Christie subsequently 
abolished the COAR through a reorganization plan and transferred its 
functions to the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs. But that 
unilateral action was later invalidated on the ground that it exceeded the 
Governor's powers as regards to the COAR under the Fair Housing Act.67 
In October 2014, COAH deadlocked on adopting new substantive rules 
establishing fair housing requirements for municipalities, thus failing to 
meet the state supreme court's deadline for adopting rules to replace those 
the court had previously struck down.68 In March 2015, in a case that has 
become known as Mount Laurel IV, the court returned the responsibility 
for overseeing compliance with the Fair Housing Act to the courts, 
designating fifteen superior court judges to arbitrate claims brought under 
the Act.69 These so-called "Mount Laurel IV cases" are just now 
proceeding through the courts and so it is premature to render any 
62 See, e.g., John M. Payne, The Paradox of Progress: Three Decades of the Mount 
Laurel Doctrine, 5 J. PLAN. HIST. 126, 131 (2006) (describing context for the change in 
methodology). 
63 In re Adoption ofN.J.A.C. 5:94 & 5:95 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 914 
A.2d 348, 400-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (finding that the COAH methodology 
was incomprehensible). 
64 In re Adoption ofN.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 74 
A.3d 893, 896 (N.J. 2013), ajf'g 6 A.3d 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). 
65 Press Release, Office of Governor Chris Christie, Governor Chris Christie Calls 
Current COAH Legislation Insufficient (Jan. 24, 2011), http://nj.gov/governor/news/ 
news/55201 l/approved/20110124b.html [https://perma.cc/A9YS-XLCF). See Stuart Meck, 
Commentary, New Jersey's Mount Laurel Doctrine and Its Implementation: Under Attack, 
But Safe (for Now), 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Jan. 2014, at4, 7 (discussing Governor Christie's 
various objections). 
66 Meck, supra note 65, at 7. 
67 In re Plan for the Abolition of the Council of Affordable Hous., 70 A.3d 559, 580 
(N.J. 2013), ajf'g 38 A.3d 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
68 In 2014, the court had granted COAH a final additional five months to adopt new 
rules. See In re Adoption ofN.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous., 
106A.3d 1173, 1173 (N.J. 2014). 
69 In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by the N.J. Council on Affordable Hous. 
(Mount Laurel IV), 110 A.3d 31, 42-43 (N.J. 2015). 
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judgments as to how these judges are faring in securing the goals of Mount 
Laurel and the Fair Housing Act.70 
A comprehensive review of how the COAH operated or an 
independent evaluation of the results achieved by the Fair Housing Act is 
beyond the scope of this writing.71 What can certainly be said, however, is 
that four decades after the courts in Pennsylvania; New Jersey, and New 
York signaled that they viewed "exclusionary zoning" by local 
governments as a concern justifying a judicial remedy, that concern 
remained vital only in New Jersey and, even there, observers disagreed on 
what Mount Laurel and the subsequent Fair Housing Act had 
accomplished. Some claimed that the Mount Laurel ruling and the Fair 
Housing Act did little to combat residential racial segregation72 or that 
most of the beneficiaries have relatively higher socio-economic status, 73 
while others argue that the results, while mixed, are largely positive.74 
It's also notable that the Mount Laurel approach to addressing 
exclusionary zoning has not been particularly influential in other 
jurisdictions. For example, in Britton v. Town of Chester,75 the New 
70 See, e.g., In re Declaratory Judgment Actions Filed by Various Municipalities, 141 
A.3d 359, 380--81 (N.J. 2016) (reversing court order directing Special Regional Master to 
include as part of fair share calculation a separate component for municipalities' fair share 
obligation during period for which Council on Affordable Housing had failed to adopt rules 
governing determination of housing obligation). 
71 Orfield, supra note 27, at 909 (reviewed several studies of the effects of Mount 
Laurel and the Fair Housing Act and found "[t]hese analyses find that its policies have 
increased the amount of affordable housing. The housing has, however, disproportionately 
benefited Whites and moderate-income persons rather than low-income persons, large 
families, and people of color"); MOUNT LAUREL 11AT25: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA OF FAIR 
SHARE HOUSING (Timothy N. Castano & Dale Sattin, eds., 2008); Alan Mallach, supra note 
52, at 111, 115; David N. Kinsey, The Growth Share Approach to Mount Laurel Housing 
Obligations: Origins, Highjacking, and Future, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 867 (2011); John 
M. Payne, Housing Rights and Remedies: A "Legislative" History ofMount Laurel II, 14 
SETON HALL L. REV. 889, 889 (1984). 
72 See, e.g., Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel 
Initiatives: An Analysis ofthe Characteristics ofApplicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1268, 1301--02 (1997) (finding little change in patterns ofresideI).tial segregation). 
73 See, e.g., Span, supra note 37, at 68 (finding that while a much larger number of 
affordable housing units have been realized via the New Jersey courts and the COAH, ttie 
residents tend to have higher socio-economic status, "but at a low point in their lifetime 
earning potential"). 
74 See, e.g., Mallach, supra note 52, at 114-15 (arguing that Mount Laurel and the Act 
created greater affordable housing options for the state's lower-income residents). 
75 595 A.2d 492, 497-98 (N.H. 1991); Brian Blaesser et al., Advocating Affordable 
Housing in New Hampshire: The Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Planning 
Association in Wayne Britton v. Town of Chester, 40 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 4 
(continued) 
73 2017] RACIAL SEGREGATION IN HOUSING 
Hampshire Supreme Court relied on an interpretation of the state's zoning 
statues to invalidate exclusionary practices, rather than an analysis based 
on the Mount Laurel doctrine or the state constitution.76 
Several other New England states, such as Massachusetts77 and Rhode 
Island,78 use a type of "housing appeals board" that provides "for a direct 
appeal and override of local decisions that reject or restrict proposals for 
low- or moderate-income housing."79 Connecticut, however, uses a court 
that can set aside local zoning decisions that receive federal or state 
assistance.80 Jllinois has also adopted this approach. 81 Some observers 
conclude that these approaches have resulted in the creation of 
significantly more affordable housing in exclusionary communities than 
(1991); John M. Payne, From the Courts: E.xclusionary Zoning and the "Chester 
Doctrine," 20 REAL EST. L.J. 366, 366--67 (1992). 
76 While the approach adopted in the Chester decision was unanticipated, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court had previously considered several challenges to exclusionary 
land use regulations, dating back to its 1978 decision in Beck v. Town of Raymond, 394 
A.2d 847 (N.H. 1978), in which it had voiced its distaste for exclusionary zoning. In Beck, 
the court warned municipalities that growth management must not be used as a pretext for 
excluding non-residents who were members of a disadvantaged social or economic groups. 
Id. at 850--51. Six years later, in Stoney-Brook Dev. Corp. v. Town of Fremont, 474 A.2d 
561 (N.H. 1984), the court held that growth controls are properly used only when they 
regulate and control development, and are invalid when used to prevent development. Id. at 
563. Finally, in Soares v. Town of Atkinson, 512 A.2d 436 (N.H. 1986), appeal after 
remand, 529 A.2d 867 (N .H. 1987), after a lower court relied on Beck and Mount laurel to 
invalidate several exclusionary zoning practices, and the town both appealed and revised its 
ordinance, the New Hampshire Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court 
which then upheld the revised ordinance. . 
77 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40B §§ 20--23 (2016). See also Erika Barber, Note, Affordable 
Housing in Massachusetts: How to Preserve the Promise of "40B" with lessons from 
Rhode Island, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 125, 128-29 (2011); Sharon Perlman Krefetz, The 
Impact and Evolution ofthe Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit and Zoning Appeals Act: 
Thirty Years of E.xperience with a State legislative Effort to Overcome E.xclusionary 
Zoning, 22 W. NEW ENG. L. REY. 381, 381-82 (2001). 
78 Rhode Island Low and Moderate Income Housing Act, 53 R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 45-53­
1-45-53-9 (West 2016). See also Barber, supra note 77, at 128-29. 
79 AM. PLANNING Ass'N, GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GUIDEBOOK: MODEL STATUTES 
FOR PLANNING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE, 4-152 (Stuart Meck ed., 2002). 
80 See generally Barber, supra note 77. See also Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut's 
Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: After Ten Years of Hope, Why Only Middling 
Results?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REY. 115, 152-53 (2001). 
81 See Heidi L. Golz, Breaking into Affluent Chicago Suburbs: An Analysis of the 
Illinois Affordable Housing Planning and Appeal Act, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & 
COMMUNITY DEY. L. 181, 181 (2006). 
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would have been created without these laws,82 while others are more 
critical.83 Still other jurisdictions use techniques such as "inclusionary 
zoning"84 or state mandates to adopt a local comprehensive plan that 
includes a detailed housing element in an effort to address housing 
affordability issues85 and, thereby, seek to lessen racial segregation in 
. 86housmg. 
While one might think that racial discrimination through exclusionary 
zoning would easily be the basis for a federal court challenge based on the 
Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution, two Supreme Court 
decisions in the 1970s all but barred such claims.87 First, in Warth v. 
Seldin, decided the same year as Mount Laurel I and the New York and 
Pennsylvania exclusionary zoning cases, the Court imposed stringent 
standing requirements on exclusionary zoning plaintiffs asserting claims 
based on the federal Constitution.88 Two years later, in Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the Court 
required that exclusionary zoning plaintiffs prove that municipal officials 
intended to engage in racial discrimination. 89 
Warth required that exclusionary zoning plaintiffs cite "specific 
concrete facts" to demonstrate both that they had been harmed by 
82 See, e.g., Barber, supra note 77; Krefetz, supra note 77; Spencer M. Cowan, Anti­
Snob Land Use Laws, Suburban Exclusion, and Housing Opportunity, 28 J. URB. AFF. 295, 
296 (2006). 
83 See, e.g., Jonathan Witten, Adult Supervision Required: The Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts's Reckless Adventures with Affordable Housing and the Anti-Snob Zoning 
Act, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 217, 252 (2008); Christopher Baker, Note, Housing in 
Crisis-A Call to Reform Massachusetts's Affordable Housing Law, 32 B.C. ENYTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 165, 205-06 (2005). 
84 See Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice oflnclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH 
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: Do THEY CONFLICT? 212 (Anthony Downs ed., 
2004); Nicholas Benson, Note, A Tale of Two Cities: Examining the Successes of 
Jnclusionary Zoning Ordinances in Montgomery County, Maryland and Boulder, Colorado, 
13 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 753, 754 (2010). 
85 See CAL. Gov'T CODE§§ 65580-65589.8 (West 2000); William C. Baer, California's 
Fair-Share Housing 1967-2004: The Planning Approach, 7 J. PLAN. HIST. 48, 50 (2008). 
86 But see Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Jnclusionary"-Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1167, 1207 (1981) (arguing that inclusionary zoning requirements can actually be 
exclusionary devices under certain circumstances). 
87 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
88 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). See also Robert G. Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair 
Housing Cases, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 27 (1980). 
89 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). See also Daniel R. Mandelker, Racial Discrimination and 
Exclusionary Zoning: A Perspective on Arlington Heights, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1217, 1243 
(1977); Robert G. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: 
Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 961, 1034 (1977). 
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exclusionary practices and that they would benefit from court 
intervention.90 To meet this standard, plaintiffs would have to point to the 
exclusion of a specific project as having caused them injury and prove that 
the court action they requested would remedy that injury.91 Because this 
task has proved particularly difficult for fair housing organizations-who, 
unlike individual plaintiffs, have the skills and resources to bring 
lawsuits-the Warth decision discouraged exclusionary zoning litigation.92 
Plaintiffs who could meet Warth 's standing requirements, such as 
prospective developers of low-income housing, faced a second hurdle in 
the federal courts.93 While exclusionary zoning arguably violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, an attack on exclusionary practices will likely fail 
unless the plaintiff alleges racial discrimination and thereby subjects the 
ordinance to heightened judicial scrutiny. But in Arlington Heights, the 
Court ruled that a claim of racial discrimination requires proof that .a 
municipality had the intent to discriminate based on race; proof that~a 
zoning practice had a racially discriminatory effect was, by itself, not 
sufficient, but could be used as evidence to prove there was a 
discriminatory intent.94 
Exclusionary zoning plaintiffs faced a less daunting task if they sued 
under the federal Fair Housing Act, because the Supreme Court had ruled 
in Arlington Heights that such claims required only proof of a racially 
discriminatory effect, not proof of intent.95 When the Court remanded the 
Arlington Heights case to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit for consideration of the plaintiff's Fair Housing Act claim, 
the Seventh Circuit reintroduced the element of intent as one of four 
factors in judging whether there was a violation of the Act and required 
that any discriminatory effect be balanced against the justifications 
asserted by the municipality.96 But another approach soon emerged that 
was far more favorable to advocates of affordable housing. 
In Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after a detailed 
90 Warth, 422 U.S. at 508. 
91 Id. at 515. 
92 See, e.g., Hope, Inc. v. Cty. of DuPage, III., 738 F.2d 797, 813-14 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(finding that the organization representing its members had no standing due to a lack of 
direct injury as exclusion from the project). See generally BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. 
WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & LITIGATION§§ 9.2-9.8 (Thomson Reuters2015). 
93 See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. 
94 Id. See BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 92, at § 9. I 2. 
95 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3617 (2016). 
96 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Viii. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 
1977). See also BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 92, at§ 9. I 6 n. 75. 
76 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [45:59 
examination of the intent issue, concluded that proof of a disproportionate 
impact on minorities was sufficient by itself.97 In 2015, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the disparate impact approach to Fair Housing Act claims in 
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., but cautioned that disparate impact liability 
must be properly limited to give housing authorities and private developers 
leeway to state and explain the valid interest served by their policies, and 
that "[g]ovemmental or private policies are not contrary to the disparate­
impact requirement unless they are 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary 
barriers. '"98 In light of this "limiting" language, and the stringent reading 
of the statute by the four dissenting Justices,99 some observers have 
sounded a cautionary note about what effect Inclusive Communities will 
"dd. 1· · 10°have m a ressmg exc us1onary zonmg. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As noted at the beginning of this writing, the passage of eight decades 
has had remarkably little effect on the patterns of racial segregation 
Professor Roberts described in her Sullivan Lecture. While the 
97 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 (2d Cir. 1988). See also BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 
92, at§ 9.16; John M. Payne, From the Courts: A Federal Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 
17 REALEST. L.J. 261 (1989). 
98 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523-24 (2015) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
431 (1971)). Circuit courts have applied the Inclusive Communities decision. See Ave. 6E 
Invs., LLC v. City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing district 
court dismissal of disparate treatment claims under FHA and the Equal Protection Clause 
on ground that the availability of similarly-priced and similarly-modeled housing in the 
same quadrant of the City as the zoned property prevented plaintiff-developers from 
showing a disparate impact); Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 611, 624 
(2d Cir. 2016) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment against Garden City 
on ground that City's decision to abandon R-M zoning in favor of R-T zoning was made 
with knowing acquiescence to race-based public input, showing discriminatory intent as 
well as disparate treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) of the FHA). 
99 Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2533-34 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito's 
dissent, joined by Chief Justfoe Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued that the 
language of the Fair Housing Act cannot be interpreted to support claims based on disparate 
impact. Id.· 
100 See, e.g., Robert G. Schwemm, Fair Housing Litigation After Inclusive 
Communities: What's New and What's Not, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 106, 115-22 
(Sept. 18, 2015); but see Noah D. Zatz, The Many Meanings of "Because Of": A Comment 
on Inclusive Communities Project, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 68 (Nov. 12, 2015) (arguing 
that the dissenters are simply wrong and their interpretation of the statute will not stand in 
the way of more robust development of disparate impact claims). For a doctrinal analysis 
of what the Inclusive Communities decision portends for equal protection theory, see 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in 
Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115 (2016). 
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combination of public policies and private preferences that gave rise to 
segregated housing, and the segregation they created, have abated 
somewhat, the numerous sources referenced at the beginning of this 
writing document the persistence of racial segregation in housing up to the 
present. 101 Distressing as this is, still worse is the fact that efforts at both 
the federal and state levels have had relatively little success at changing 
these patterns. 
The 41-year history of New Jersey's Mount Laurel doctrine illustrates 
the difficulty faced in addressing the problem. When little had been 
accomplished in the eight years following the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey's landmark ruling in Mount Laurel I, the Court's Mount Laurel II 
ruling, by allowing a "builder's remedy" and assigning exclusionary 
zoning challenges to a hand-picked group of judges, effectively forced the 
legislature to act. 102 The resulting Fair Housing Act, while controversial 
from its inception due to its allowing for Regional Contribution 
Agreements, established a workable administrative system for ensuring 
that local governments met their "fair share" affordable housing 
obligations.103 Over time, however, the Council on Affordable Housing 
(COAR), unable to surmount technical problems and facing political and 
public opposition, proved incapable of meeting its obligations under the 
Fair Housing Act. 104 Finally, in 2015, thirty years after the legislature had 
replaced court supervision of municipal "fair share" obligations with the 
COAR, the Court found it had no choice but to return the responsibility for 
overseeing compliance with the Fair Housing Act to the judiciary.105 And 
this is the history of the jurisdiction uniformly acknowledged as having 
done the most to address exclusionary housing policies. 
IOI See supra notes 5-24 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 55, 62-70 and accompanying text. 
ws See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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